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COMMENTS
BLESSED ARE THE FAITHFUL: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
SCOPE AND APPLICABILITY OF THE GOOD FAITH
EXCEPTION TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE.
The fourth amendment gives the people the right to be secure
from unreasonable searches and seizures of their person, houses,
papers, and effects. For years, the Supreme Court has mandated
that any property seized in violation of the fourth amendment be
excluded from evidence at the defendant's trial. Recently, however, the Supreme Court has created a good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule and caused uncertainty regarding the new exception's application. The author reviews the development of the
exclusionary rule and analyzes the effect of the good faith exception. The author also discusses the application of the exception
to searches and seizures conducted with and without warrants,
and considers the proper course for Maryland courts to follow.

I.

INTRODUCTION

The adoption of the good faith exception 1 is the latest in a recent
line of Supreme Court rulings limiting the scope and applicability of the
exclusionary rule. 2 The amorphous concept of "good faith" creates significant uncertainty regarding the application of the exception and the
possible extension of the exception to searches and seizures conducted
without a warrant. 3 Expansion of the good faith exception could change
1. See United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984); Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 104
S. Ct. 3424 (1984).
2. See, e.g., Segura v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 3380 (1984) (exclusionary rule not
applicable to suppress evidence discovered during the execution of a subsequently
issued search warrant, where there had been a prior unlawful entry and warrantless
seizure, if the probable cause for the search warrant came from an independent
source); Nix v. Williams, 104 S. Ct. 2501 (1984) (exclusionary rule not applicable to
exclude physical evidence that inevitably would have been discovered); INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 104 S. Ct. 3479 (1984) (exclusionary rule not applicable to deportation hearings).
3. In INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 104 S. Ct. 3479 (1984), the Supreme Court held that the
exclusionary rule is inapplicable to civil deportation hearings held by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. [d. at 3490. The Lopez-Mendoza case involved an
allegedly illegal arrest, not an illegal search warrant. In his dissent, which centered
on his belief that the majority's conclusion was based on an incorrect assessment of
the costs and benefits of applying the rule in deportation hearings, Justice White
stated:
In United States v. Leon ... we have held that the exclusionary rule is not
applicable when officers are acting in objective good faith. Thus, if the
agents neither know nor should have known that they were acting contrary to the dictates of the Fourth Amendment, evidence will not be suppressed even if it is held that their conduct was illegal.
[d. at 3493 (White, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
In a separate dissent Justice Stevens stated: "Because the Court has not yet

1986]

Blessed Are the Faithful

497

materially the protections provided by the fourth amendment.
This comment begins by tracing the development of the exclusionary rule and reviewing the purposes underlying the good faith exception. 4
Following this review, the discussion focuses on the value of the good
faith exceptionS and examines the current scope and application of the
exception. 6 This comment then analyzes the propriety of a possible extension of the exception to warrantless searches and seizures.7 Finally,
Maryland's position is considered and a course for the state courts to
follow is proposed. 8
II.

AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

A.

The Development of the Exclusionary Rule

The seminal case in the establishment of the exclusionary rule is
Weeks v. United States. 9 There, a Federal Marshal searched the defendant's room without a warrant and seized certain letters and envelopes. lO
The materials seized were introduced into evidence over the defendant's
objection that the evidence was inadmissible because it was obtained in
violation of the fourth and fifth amendments. I I In reversing the trial
court's decision to admit the evidence, the Weeks Court, relying on the
history of the fourth amendment, reasoned that:
The effect of the Fourth Amendment is to put the courts of the
United States and Federal officials, ... under limitations and
restraints. . . . The tendency of those who execute the criminal
laws of this country to obtain convictions by means of unlawful
seizures and enforced confessions, . . . should find no sanction
in the judgments of the courts ....1 2 '
The Court held that when an official of the United States obtains evi-

4.

5.
6.

7.
8.
9.

10.
11.
12.

held that the rule of United States v. Leon ... has any application to warrantless
searches, I do not join the portion of Justice White's opinion that relies on that case.
I do, however, agree with the remainder of his dissenting opinion." Id. at 3496
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
Three rationales have been cited in support of the exclusionary rule. First, it is the
constitutionally guaranteed remedy of the accused. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961). Second, it is the imperative of judicial integrity. See McNabb v. United
States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943). Third, it serves only to deter similar future violations of
the fourth amendment by police. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 65 (1976).
See infra notes 75-103 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 104-77 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 178-203 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 204-21 and accompanying text.
232 U.S. 383 (1914). In Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), the Supreme
Court found the seizure of an individual's private books and papers violative of the
fourth amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures and the fifth
amendment right against compelled self-incrimination. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 633; see
infra note 42.
Weeks, 232 U.S. at 386.
Id. at 388.
Id. at 391-92.
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dence in a manner that violates the constitutional mandate prohibiting
unreasonable searches and seizures, such evidence must be excluded
from trial. 13
The Court's ruling evoked spirited response from legal commentators.14 Support for the Court's holding was predicated upon the proposition that the government should not violate the law or encourage future
lawlessness by using illegally obtained evidence at trial. 15 Opponents of
the Court's new rule reasoned that exclusion of the evidence did nothing
to punish an official who unlawfully seized evidence but often resulted in
the release of a guilty defendant. 16 The logic in support of the rule prevailed, and the development of the exclusionary rule continued.

B.

The Applicability of the Exclusionary Rule to the States

Under Weeks, the exclusionary rule applied only to actions by officers of the federal government.J7 In Wolf v. Colorado,18 the Court first
13. Id. at 398.
14. Justices Brandeis and Holmes both supported the rule. See infra note 15. Judge
Cardozo and Justice Jackson, as well as evidence scholar John Henry Wigmore,
opposed the rule. See infra note 16.
15. Justice Brandeis, in his dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. United States, stated:
Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a law breaker, it breeds
contempt for the law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it
promotes anarchy. To declare that in the administration of the criminal
law the end justifies the means - to declare that the Government may
commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private criminal would bring terrible retribution.
27 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Justice Holmes, in his dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. United States, stated:
It is desirable that criminals should be detected, and to that end that all
evidence shall be used. It also is desirable that the Government should not
itself foster and pay for other crimes, when they are the means by which
the evidence is to be obtained.... We have to choose, and for my part I
think it is a less evil that some criminals should escape than that the Government should play an ignoble part.
277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
16. Then Judge Cardozo, speaking for the majority in People v. Defore, stated: "The
criminal is to go free because the constable blundered. . . . A room is searched
against the law, and the body of the murdered man is found .... The privacy of the
home has been infringed and the murderer goes free." 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 23-24, 150
N.E. 585, 587-88 (1926). Justice Jackson, speaking for the majority in Irvine v. California, noted: "Rejection of the evidence does nothing to punish the wrong-doing
defendant official, while it may, and likely will release the wrong-doing defendant."
347 U.S. 128, 137-38 (1954). Professor Wigmore noted:
Titus, you have been found guilty of conducting a lottery, Flavius, you
have confessedly violated the Constitution. Titus ought to suffer imprisonment for crime and Flavious for contempt. But no! We shall let you both
go free. We shall not punish Flavius directly, but shall so by reversing
Titus' conviction.
8 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, § 2184 (3d ed. 1940).
17. 232 U.S. at 398. The fourth amendment does not apply to searches and seizures by
private citizens, United States v. Jacobsen, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 1656 (1984) (quoting
Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 662 (Blackmun, J., dissenting», but does
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addressed the applicability of the rule to officers of state governments. 19
In Wolf, the Court asserted that state approval of police conduct that
violated the fourth amendment contravened the fourteenth amendment. 20 Nevertheless, the Court held that, although the exclusion of evidence may be an effective method of deterring illegal searches, it was not
for the Court to condemn a state's reliance upon other methods of deterrence, which, if consistently enforced, would be as effective as the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence at tria1. 21 Consequently, the Court did
not require state courts to adopt the exclusionary rule. 22
Thirty-seven years later, in Mapp v. Ohio,23 the Supreme Court
changed its position and held that the exclusionary rule was mandatory
in state courtS.24 Justice Clark, writing the plurality opinion, reasoned
that the exclusionary rule was applicable to the states because it was an
essential part of both the fourth and fourteenth amendments. 25 Justice
Clark stated that the factual grounds upon which Wolf was based were
no longer controlling26 and that "the admission of the new constitutional
right by Wolf could not consistently tolerate denial of its most important
constitutional privilege, namely, the exclusion of the evidence .... "27
apply to officers of all branches of the government. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct.
733, 739-41 (1984); see infra note 58.
18. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
19.Id.
20. Id. at 31. Prior to the Wolf decision 31 states had rejected the Weeks doctrine and
16 states had accepted it. Id. at 29-30.
The Wolf decision led to what has been called the "silver platter" doctrine.
Because the exclusionary rule was applicable only to federal officers and federal
courts, and not to state officers or state courts, any evidence recovered by state
police during illegal searches could be used against a defendant in state or federal
courts. In addition, if federal agents conducted impermissible searches, any discovered evidence could be given to state agents to be used against a defendant in state
courts. These practices were eliminated by Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206
(1960) and Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956). In Elkins, the Court held
that evidence obtained by state officers in violation of an individual's fourth amendment rights was inadmissible in a federal trial. 364 U.S. at 223. The Court relied on
the concept of judicial integrity, reasoning that the acceptance of evidence secured
through a flagrant disregard of an individual's constitutional rights made courts
accomplices to wrongdoing and created federal action sufficient to invoke the exclusionary rule. Id. In Rea, the Court held that the exclusion of illegally seized evidence was an appropriate remedy against a federal agent who planned to use his
illegal search and seizure as the basis of his testimony in state court. 350 U.S. at
217-18.
21. Wolf, 338 U.S. at 31-32.
22. /d. at 33.
23. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
24. Id. at 650-53. Justice Clark noted that, at the time of the Wolf decision, "[t]he
contrariety of views of the States was ... particularly impressive." Id. at 651 (quoting Wolf, 3~8 U.S. at 29); see supra note 22. However, more than half of the states
passing on the question since Wolf had wholly or partly adhered to the Weeks doctrine. /d.
25. Id. at 657.
26. /d. at 653.
27. /d. at 656.
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Although the Mapp decision never has been overruled, the reasoning behind its holding - that the exclusionary rule is a constitutionally mandated remedy of the aggrieved - has been abandoned. 28
C

The Purposes of the Exclusionary Rule

Three arguments have been advanced to justify the exclusionary
rule: (1) the rule is a constitutionally guaranteed remedy of the aggrieved;29 (2) the rule is necessary to maintain judicial integrity;30 and (3)
the rule serves as a deterrent to future violations of the fourth amendment by government officials. 31
1.

The exclusion of evidence is not a constitutionally guaranteed
remedy

The constitutional remedy argument has its ongms in Boyd v.
United States. 32 The Boyd Court held that to require someone to produce his private papers to be used against him in evidence is analogous to
compelling someone to testify against himself and, thus, constitutes an
unreasonable search and seizure under the fourth amendment. 33 In
Weeks, the Court noted: "If letters and private documents can thus be
28. E.g., United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3412 (1984) (fourth amendment contains no provision expressly precluding the use of evidence obtained in violation of
its commands); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 540 (1976) (exclusion of evidence
does not cure the invasion of the defendant's fourth amendment rights); United
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974) (use of the fruits of past unlawful
search or seizure works no new fourth amendment wrong).
29. United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3430-31 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 39192 (1914).
30. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222-23 (1960); McNabb v. United States, 318
U.S. 332, 345 (1943); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914).
31. E.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 484 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S.
338, 348 (1974); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960).
32. 116 U.S. 616 (1886) see C. Moylan, The Supreme Court, the Fourth Amendment and
the Exclusionary Rule, The Daily Record, July 12, 1984 at 1, col. 4.
33. [d. at 621-30. Justice Bradley, writing for the majority in Boyd, conducted an indepth historical analysis of the developments of the fourth and fifth amendments,
tracing the protected rights back to Lord Camden's interpretation of the British
Constitution in 1765. 116 U.S. at 621-33. Justice Bradley concluded that the two
amendments "throw great light on each other." "The unreasonable searches and
seizures condemned by the Fourth Amendment are almost always made for the
purpose of compelling a man to give evidence against himself which is condemned
by the fifth amendment." [d. at 633.
The rationale of Boyd was eroded severely by the Supreme Court's opinion in
Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585, 598 (1904), which held that the use of an individual's papers found in a legal search is not compelled self-incrimination. See also
Doe v. United States, 465 U.S. 605 (1984) (grand jury subpoena of business records
is not compelled self-incrimination); Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 470-77
(1976) (use of defendant's business records, seized pursuant to office search did not
offend fifth amendment); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 396-401 (1976) (a
summons requiring the production of a taxpayer's records did not violate the fifth
amendment proscription against compelled self-incrimination).
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seized and held and used in evidence, ... the protection of the Fourth
Amendment declaring his right to be secure against such searches and
seizures is of no value, and, ... might as well be stricken from the Constitution."34 The Weeks Court stated that failure to return items taken
from the defendant's house pursuant to an illegal search constituted "a
denial of the constitutional rights of the accused."35
The Wolf decision was the first to distinguish between the constitutional protection afforded the individual by the fourth amendment and
the use of the exclusionary rule as a nonconstitutionally required device
for deterring violations. 36 The Wolf Court recognized that the fourth
amendment is enforceable against the states through the Due Process
Clause of the fourteenth amendment. 37 That Court then refused to apply
the exclusionary rule to the states, however, reasoning that the methods
of protecting a defendant's fourth amendment right should be left to the
discretion of the states. 38 The Court noted that the Weeks rule barring
evidence secured through an illegal search "was not derived from the
explicit requirements of the Fourth Amendment. . .. The decision was a
matter of judicial implication."39
In the later Mapp decision, the Court held that the exclusionary rule
is an essential part of the fourth and fourteenth amendments. 40 Justice
Black, concurring in Mapp, recognized that although the rule is not
required by the express language of the Constitution, the rule "is amply
justified from an historical standpoint [and] soundly based in
reason .... "41
Decisions since Mapp have reverted to the Wolf analysis that the
exclusionary rule is a nonconstitutionally required device for deterring
fourth amendment violations. In holding that Mapp should not be applied retrospectively, Justice Clark, writing for the majority of the Court
in Linkletter v. Walker,42 stated that Mapp's primary purpose was to provide for enforcement of fourth amendment guarantees through the use of
the exclusionary rule. 43 Justice Clark further stated that although the
exclusion of illegally seized evidence was the only effective deterrent to
lawless police action, this deterrent purpose would not be advanced by
applying the rule retrospectively.44 Thus, the Linkletter decision aban34. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 393.
35. Id. at 398.
36. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
37. Wolf, 338 U.S. at 27-28.
38. Id. at 28.
39.Id.
40. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 657. The Court noted that "our holding that the exclusionary
rule is an essential part of both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments is not only
the logical dictate of prior cases, but it also makes very good sense." Id.
41. Id. at 662 (Black, J., concurring).
42. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
43. Id. at 636.
44. Id. at 636-37. The Linkletter interpretation of Mapp would be less persuasive had
Justice Clark not written both opinions. Because Justice Clark did write both opin-
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doned the constitutional remedy argument and became the first of many
cases to rely on the deterrent theory.45
United States v. Calandra 46 was the first case to state explicitly that
the exclusionary rule is not a constitutional right of the aggrieved. Quoting Linkletter, the Court stated that the purpose of the rule is not to
redress an injury to the privacy of the aggrieved: "[T]he ruptured privacy of the victims' homes and effects cannot be restored. Reparation
comes too late. "47 Instead, the Court found the primary purpose of the
exclusionary rule to be deterrence of future conduct that violates the
fourth amendment. 48 The Court held that the rule does not apply to
exclude illegally seized evidence from grand jury hearings, because the
damage to such proceedings created by the exclusion of evidence greatly
outweighs any possible incremental deterrent effect.49
The constitutionally guaranteed remedy theory was short-lived. It
served its purpose in Mapp, when the Court needed a rationale to support
the logical extension of the exclusionary rule to the states, but was abandoned because strict adherence to it would require exclusion of evidence
in cases where exclusion would have little or no deterrent effect. 50
2.

The rule is not the imperative of judicial integrity

A second argument for applying the exclusionary rule is that it is
the imperative of judicial integrity. This argument dates back to the
original reasoning in support of the exclusionary rule. 51 The rationale
behind this idea is that, by accepting evidence acquired through illegal
means, courts become accomplices in the illegal police activity and encourage the continuation of illegal evidence-gathering techniques.
This argument was accepted by the Supreme Court in McNabb v.

45.

46.
47.
48.
49.

50.
51.

ions, it seems likely that the Linkletter decision is merely an interpretation of Mapp,
not a departure from it.
See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3413-16 (1984) (to exclude evidence
seized in objective good faith pursuant to a technically invalid search warrant does
not serve a deterrent purpose); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 492-94 (1976) (raising
search and seizure claims in federal habeas corpus review would not serve a deterrent purpose); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 447-60 (1976) (exclusion ofillegaIly seized evidence from civil trials would not serve a deterrent purpose); United
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349-52 (1974) (extending exclusionary rule to
grand jury proceedings would achieve only a speculative deterrent effect at the expense of substantially impeding the grand jury's role).
414 U.S. 338 (1974).
/d. at 347 (quoting Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 637).
/d.
[d. at 354. Similarly, in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), the Court held that
the exclusionary rule was not applicable to habeas corpus proceedings. [d. at 494.
Citing Linkletter and Calandra, the opinion stated that "[p]ost-Mapp decisions have
established that the rule is not a personal constitutional right." [d. at 486.
See infra notes 68, 77.
In Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), the Court stated: "The effect of the
Fourth Amendment is to put the courts of the United States and Federal officials
... under limitations and restraints as to the exercise of [their] authority." [d. at
392; see supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text.
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United States,52 where the Court held that "a conviction resting on evidence secured through such a flagrant disregard of the procedure which
Congress has commanded cannot be allowed to stand without making
the courts themselves accomplices in willful disobedience of the law."53
In Elkins v. United States,54 the Court relied on the language of McNabb and held that federal courts could not accept evidence obtained
illegally by state officers. 55 The Court held that "evidence obtained by
state officers during a search which, if conducted by federal officers,
would have violated the defendant's [fourth amendment rights] is inadmissible over a defendant's timely objection in a federal criminal trial. "56
Because the exclusionary rule was not then applicable to the states, the
Court used the judicial integrity reasoning to support its holding in
ElkinsY
When the judicial integrity argument is extended to its logical conclusion, the weakness of the argument is revealed. If courts are precluded from accepting any evidence seized illegally, courts would not be
able to accept evidence obtained illegally by private persons, although
not in violation of the fourth amendment. This extension, however, has
never been adopted by the Court. The Court has limited the exclusionary rule to governmental conduct in violation of the fourth
amendment. 58
The judicial integrity argument, like the constitutionally guaranteed
remedy argument, was used by the Court to solve the practical problem
presented by the facts in Elkins, but discarded when it became a barrier
to other policy decisions. 59 In Stone v. Powell,6O the Court stated that
52. 318 U.S. 332 (1943). In McNabb, federal agents questioned prisoners accused of
killing a federal revenue agent in violation of a Congressional command making it
the duty of all federal agents to take prisoners to a judicial officer before questioning.
[d. at 342. McNabb's judicial integrity language, although not involving a Constitutional violation, became the basis for applying the judicial integrity argument to
fourth amendment violations. See infra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
53. McNabb, 318 U.S. at 345.
54. 364 U.S. 206 (1960); see supra note 20.
55. /d. at 223; see supra note 20.
56. /d.
57. Because the Elkins decision was before Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the
exclusionary rule was not yet applicable to the fruits of unconstitutional searches
made by state officers.
58. The fourth amendment applies only to actions by the government, "it is wholly
inapplicable 'to a search or seizure, even an unreasonable one, effected by a private
individual not acting as an agent of the Government or with the participation or
knowledge of any government officiaL'" United States v. Jacobsen, 104 S. Ct. 1652,
1656 (1984) (quoting Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 662 (1980) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting». The fourth amendment does apply, however, to civil as well as
criminal authorities of the government. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733, 740
(1984) (school teachers); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967)
(building inspectors); Marshall v. Bailow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312-13 (1978) (Occupational Safety and Health Administration inspectors); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S.
499, 506 (1978) (firefighters).
59. See infra note 61.
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"although our decisions often have alluded to the 'imperative of judicial
integrity' ... this concern has limited force as a justification for the exclusion of highly probative evidence."61
3.

The purpose of the rule is to deter illegal police conduct

The only surviving purpose for the existence of the exclusionary rule
is to deter future fourth amendment violations. This purpose has been
cited frequently, even by those decisions that also had advanced the constitutionally guaranteed remedy or judicial integrity arguments. 62 Under
the deterrence argument, evidence illegally obtained is excluded only if
exclusion will deter future police violations of fourth amendment
rights. 63 The Court regularly has refused to apply the exclusionary rule
when it would not serve as a deterrent to such conduct. 64 The Court's
60. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
61. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 485.
Justice Powell cited numerous situations where the judicial integrity theory, if
logically extended, would require different results. Id. It would require abandonment of the standing requirement to argue exclusion. But see United States v.
Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 733-37 (1980) (supervisory power of the federal courts does
not authorize suppression of otherwise admissible evidence on the grounds that it
was seized illegally from a third party not before the court); Rakas v. Illinois, 439
U.S. 128, 133-38 (1978) (a person aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure only
through the introduction of evidence procured through an illegal search of a third
person's premises has not had his fourth amendment rights infringed). It would
require exclusion of evidence for impeachment purposes. But see United States v.
Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 624-28 (1980) (a defendant's statements made in response to
proper cross-examination, reasonably suggested by defendant's direct examination,
are subject to impeachment by the use of illegally obtained evidence); Walden v.
United States, 347 U.S. 62, 62-66 (1954) (illegally seized evidence admissible for the
limited purpose of impeaching defendant's credibility, once the door is opened by
defendant's own statements). It would require that judicial proceedings abate when
the defendant's person is unconstitutionally seized. But see Gerstein v. Pugh, 420
U.S. 103, 119 (1975) (illegal arrest does not void a subsequent conviction); Frisbie v.
Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522 (1952) (power of a court to try a person for crime is not
impaired by the fact that he was brought into the court's jurisdiction by force). It
would require exclusion of evidence from grand jury proceedings. But see United
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 353-55 (1974) (grand jury questions based on evidence obtained from an unlawful search and seizure involve no new fourth amendment wrong). Finally, it would require exclusion of evidence despite the defendant's
lack of objection. But see Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 449-53 (1965) (failure
to object to a Constitutional breach of rights effects a waiver thereof).
62. In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the Court noted: "Only last year the Court
itself recognized that the purpose of the exclusionary rule 'is to deter - to compel
respect for the constitutional guarantee in the only available way - by removing
the incentive to disregard it.''' Id. at 656 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S.
206, 217 (1960). For a discussion of Mapp's constitutionally guaranteed remedy
theory, see supra notes 47, 48 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Elkins'
judicial integrity theory, see supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
63. E.g., United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3412 (1984); United States v. Calandra,
414 U.S. 338, 347-48 (1974); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636-37 (1965).
64. The exclusionary rule has not been applied to evidence discovered during the execution of a subsequently issued search warrant where there had been a prior unlawful
entry and warrantless seizure if the probable cause for the search warrant came
from an independent source. Segura v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 3380 (1984). Nor
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adoption of the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule 65 follows
from the Court's acceptance of the deterrence rationale. Unfortunately,
the good faith exception is stated in broad terms and is open to misapplication by lower courtS. 66
III.

THE GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION TO SEARCHES
PURSUANT TO A WARRANT

In United States v. Leon,67 the Supreme Court established an exception to the exclusionary rule. In August, 1981, a confidential informant
of unproven reliability informed an officer of the Burbank Police Department that two persons known to him as "Armando" and "Patsy" were
selling large quantities of cocaine and methaqualone from their residence
in Burbank. 68 The Burbank police then conducted an investigation that
resulted in several observations supporting the informant's story.69
Based on the information supplied by the informant and the information
compiled during the investigation, a facially valid search warrant was
issued in September, 1981, by a state superior courtjudgeJo The United
States District Court for the Central District of California suppressed
some of the evidence because the warrant was insufficient to establish

65.
66.
67.
68.

69.

70.

has it been applied at a deportation hearing, INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 104 S. Ct. 3479
(1984), to exclude physical evidence that would have been inevitably discovered,
Nix v. Williams, lO4 S. Ct. 2501 (1984), to impeachment situations, United States v.
Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954), to situations where police enforce a law later declared to be unconstitutional, Michigan v.
Defillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979), to the use of a live witness discovered by an unconstitutional search, United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978); Michigan v.
Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974), to federal habeas corpus review, Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465 (1976), to civil proceedings, United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976), to
grand jury proceedings, United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974), or retroactively, Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984).
See infra notes 128-36, 158-66, 188-92 and accompanying text.
104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984).
Id. at 3409-lO. The informant also indicated that he had witnessed a sale ofmethaqual one by "Patsy" at the residence approximately five months earlier and observed
at that time a shoebox containing a large amount of cash that belonged to "Patsy."
He also said the "Armando" and "Patsy" kept only small quantities of drugs at
their residence and stored the remainder at another location in Burbank. Id. at
34lO.
Id. The Burbank police investigated the residence described by the informant. Cars
parked at the residence were determined to belong to Armando Sanchez and Patsy
Stewart. The police also observed a man convicted of possession of marijuana in
large quantitites enter the house and exit shortly with a small paper sack. An investigation of that man led police to Alberto Lear, who had been arrested on drug
charges in 1980, and whom police had an independent basis for believing had a large
quantity of methaqualone at his residence and was heavily involved in the importation of drugs. The police also observed several persons, at least one of whom had
prior drug involvements, arriving at the residence and leaving with small packages.
Id.
The ensuing searches produced large quantities of drugs from several residences and
in cars belonging to those accused. Id.
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probable cause71 and a divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.72 Both courts refused the government's invitation to recognize a good faith exception to the exclusionary
rule. 73 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that evidence will not be
excluded in situations where a police officer acts in good faith, in both the
application for, and the execution of, a subsequently invalidated search
warrant. 74

A.

Is the Good Faith Exception Sound?

The basis of the good faith exception rests in the acceptance of deterrence of police misconduct as the purpose of the exclusionary rule. In
Leon,75 the Court reaffirmed the proposition that deterrence is the reason
for invoking the exclusionary rule. 76 The Court also reaffirmed that the
deterrent effect of the rule must be weighed against the high cost of excluding evidence and losing convictions. 77 The Leon Court determined
that the deterrent effect of excluding evidence is minimal and greatly outweighed by the high cost of excluding relevant evidence where an officer
relied, in good faith, upon the decision of a magistrate. 78
The problem with the Court's cost/benefit analysis is that there is
very little empirical data showing that either the "costs" are too high or
the "benefits" are too low.79 According to Justice Brennan, the majority
has created "an illusion of technical precision and ineluctability,"
notwithstanding that no empirical method of evaluating the costs and
benefits of the exclusionary rule has been devised. 80
Absent any hard data, the cost/benefit analysis can be conducted
only by weighing what the Supreme Court Justices believe to be the costs
and benefits associated with the exclusion of evidence. Justice White,
speaking for the majority in Leon, stated that it is unreasonable to expect
a police officer to question the decision of a magistrate once the magistrate assures the officer that a warrant complies with the fourth amendment. Exclusion of evidence in such a situation, therefore, would serve
71. [d. at 3411 n.2.
72. The warrant was invalidated by the two lower courts using the two-pronged test
established in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) and Spinelli v. United States,
393 U.S. 410 (1969). That test was abandoned by the Supreme Court in favor of a
less technical "totality of the circumstances" test in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213
(1983). For a brief discussion of Gates, see infra notes 139-51 and accompanying
text.
73. Leon,l04 S. Ct. at 3411. In response to a request of the government, the district
court made it clear that Officer Rombach had acted in good faith. [d.
74. [d. at 3420-21.
75. /d.
76. /d. at 3412.
77. [d. at 3412-13.
78. [d. at 3419.
79. See id. at 3413 n.6; id. at 3437 n.9 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
80. [d. at 3430 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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no deterrent purpose. 8!
The majority's reasoning is grounded on the premise that only the
police, not issuing magistrates, are to be deterred by the exclusionary
rule. 82 The majority found that this premise does not offend the idea that
the deterrent effect is "systemic."83 "The justification for the exclusion
of evidence obtained by improper methods is to motivate the law enforcement profession as a whole - not the aberrant individual officer - to
adopt and enforce regular procedures that will avoid the future invasion
of the citizen's constitutional rights."84
Justice White explained that systemic deterrence is not offended by
the good faith exception because "[j]udges and magistrates are not adjuncts to the law enforcement team; as neutral judicial officers, they have
no stake in the outcome of particular criminal prosecutions. The threat
of exclusion cannot be expected significantly to deter them."85
Justice White also suggested that professional incentives, such as
professional ethics or fear of removal, will deter judicial officers from
issuing improper warrants. 86 This logic is faulty, however, because not
all magistrates are required to be judges or even lawyers. 87 Moreover, all
magistrates bring with them whatever ideas they have regarding law and
order, inevitably resulting in different results from different magistrates,
absent some deterrent guidelines.
In Shadwick v. City of Tampa,88 the Court held that a municipal
clerk, who was neither a lawyer nor a judge, could issue warrants legitimately for nonfelonies. 89 Magistrates who are not lawyers or judges are
not subject to the same professional incentives that Justice White suggested. Moreover, the lay magistrate will not have the benefit of a legal
education and is thus more likely to have, and be affected by, personal
ideas about law and order. It is unrealistic and naive to suggest that each
8l. Id. at 3420.
82. The cornerstone of the Leon decision is that it is the police, not the magistrate, who
are to be deterred by the exclusion of evidence. Id. at 3418 n.15. Justice White
dismissed the idea that the rule had any deterrent effect on magistrates or others
who issue search warrants. [d. at 3418 n.17.
83. See Mertens & Wasserstrom, The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule:
Deregulating the Police and Derailing the Law, 70 GEO. L.J. 365, 399-401 (1981).
84. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 221 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring).
85. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3418. Justice White's reasoning seems to be based on the "neutral and detached" requirement established in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443 (1971). In Coolidge, the Supreme Court held that probable cause determinations and the issuance of a search warrant must be made by a "neutral and detached magistrate." The Court there invalidated a warrant issued by an attorney
general. [d. at 449-53.
86. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3418-19 n.18. Justice White stated that federal magistrates, for
example, are subject to supervision of the district courts. "They may be removed
for 'incompetency, misconduct, neglect of duty, or physical or mental disability.' "
[d. at 3419 n.18 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 631(i».
87. Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345 (1972) (search warrant issued by municipal clerk upheld so long as neutral and detached).
88.Id.
89. Id. at 352.
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magistrate, even those subject to scrutiny under federal law, does not
have his own ideas about criminal law enforcement that influence his
daily decisions. No one would assert that Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Brennan have the same philosophy about the proper balance between
criminal law enforcement and the rights of the citizen; their differing philosophies are obvious from their respective judicial opinions. It is unreasonable to suggest that magistrates are any different. If the deterrent
effect were extended to issuing magistrates, inconsistent decisions on the
same set of facts by different magistrates would be less likely to occur.
Another reason used to support the good faith exception is that police officers should be rewarded for following procedures that have been
authorized by either the judiciary or the legislature. It has been argued
that when a police officer has complied with the relevant legal rules for
searches and seizures but the evidence he gathers still is excluded from
trial, the officer easily becomes contemptuous of the warrant requirement
and is encouraged to resort to warrantless searches, with the hope that
some exception to the warrant requirement might develop at the time of
the search. 90
The idea that police should be rewarded for following presumptively
correct procedures has its origins in Michigan v. Defillippo.9) There the
Court held that where a police officer has made an arrest pursuant to a
substantive criminal statute subsequently declared unconstitutional, the
fruits of a search incident to that arrest should not be suppressed. 92 The
Court reasoned that to hold otherwise would encourage police officers to
speculate concerning the constitutionality of every law they sought to
enforce. 93 "Society would be ill-served if its police officers took it upon
themselves to determine which laws are and which laws are not constitutionally entitled to enforcement."94
Thus, in the context of either an existing presumptively valid statute
or a presumptively valid warrant, it is unreasonable and illogical to expect a police officer to question the authority that he is dutifully following. To do so would make a policeman's job impossible. Ifhe questioned
the authority he would be guilty of derelection of duty, if he did not
90. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983). The Court noted:
If the affidavits submitted by police officers are subjected to the type of
scrutiny some courts have deemed appropriate, police might well resort to
warrantless searches, with the hope of relying on consent or some other
exception to the Warrant Clause that might develop at the time of search.
In addition, the possession of a warrant by officers conducting an arrest or
search greatly reduces the perception of unlawful or intrusive police conduct, by assuring 'the individual whose property is searched or seized of
the lawful authority of the executing officer, his need to search, and the
limits of his power to search."
Id. (quoting United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977)).
91. 443 U.S. 31 (1979).
92. /d. at 37-38.
93. Id. at 38.
94.Id.
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question the authority the evidence would be suppressed. 95
In sum, the weakest point in the argument for the good faith exception is its failure to recognize the deterrent effect the exclusionary rule
would have on a magistrate to prevent him from issuing invalid warrants.
This weakness is outweighed, however, by the necessity of encouraging
police officers to adhere to the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment by submitting their factual basis for probable cause to a neutral and
detached magistrate before invading an area protected by the fourth
amendment.

B.

Opposition to the Good Faith Exception

Those who oppose the good faith exception argue that deterrence is
not the primary purpose or goal of the exclusionary rule. In his dissent
in Leon, Justice Brennan, with whom Justice Marshall joined, clung to
the argument that the exclusionary rule is an integral part of the fourth
amendment. 96 Justice Brennan stated that "[a] proper understanding of
the broad purposes sought to be served by the Fourth Amendment demonstrates that the principles embodied in the exclusionary rule rest upon
a far firmer constitutional foundation than the shifting sands of the
Court's deterrence rationale."97 Unfortunately, in relying on the constitutional remedy theory, Justice Brennan is "refighting old battles that
have long since been lost. "98
Another argument against the exception is the similarly moribund
proposition that the rule is the imperative of judicial integrity. The
Court often has stated that when more important issues present themselves, judicial integrity must give ground. 99 Like the constitutional remedy theory, the judicial integrity theory is unpersuasive.
Another argument in opposition to the good faith exception is that it
promotes magistrate shopping and inconsistent results. Because the
magistrate's decision is not subject to judicial review, magistrates are free
to issue warrants in accordance with their own SUbjective standards.
Thus the different personal beliefs of magistrates will result in different
decisions on the same set of facts. An officer who knows that magistrate
A is more likely to issue a warrant than magistrate B, will seek a warrant
from magistrate A. Justice White dismissed this practical problem as
"speculative" and concluded that suppression of evidence should be decided on a case-by-case basis. 100 This implies that if magistrate shopping
95.
96.
97.
98.

[d. at 38.
Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3430-31 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
[d. at 3431.
C. Moylan, The Supreme Court, the Fourth Amendment and The Exclusionary Rule,
The Daily Record, July 12, 1984 at 4, col. 5; see supra text accompanying notes 32SO.
99. See supra text accompanying notes 51-61.
100. [d. at 3419.
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can be proved in a particular case, a reviewing court will be correct in
finding bad faith.
Finally, one theoretical argument against the good faith exception is
that a reviewing court operating under the exception will never reach any
novel fourth amendment claims, because the only question to be answered by an appellate court is whether there was objective good faith on
the part of the police officer. 101 Justice White countered this argument
by saying that "[t]here is no need for courts to adopt the inflexible practice of always deciding whether the officers' conduct manifested objective
good faith before turning to the question whether the Fourth Amendment has been violated."102 If the reviewing court believed that no important fourth amendment questions were at issue, the court simply
could decide the case by turning immediately to the consideration of the
officer's good faith.103 This seems to give the reviewing court the choice
of whether or not to address a fourth amendment claim, which is exactly
what critics fear. Justice White should have set up a two-step approach,
in order to assure that the fourth amendment claims be addressed before
turning to the question of the officer's good faith.
C

The Scope and Application of the Good Faith Exception

1.

The Good Faith Exception is Limited to Warrants

Although some of the reasoning relied upon by the Leon Court in
accepting the good faith exception also has been cited in support of extending the exception to warrantless searches,I04 the Supreme Court in
Leon and its companion case, Massachusetts v. Sheppard,105 stated that
the good faith exception is applicable "when the officer conducting the
search acted in objectively reasonable reliance on a warrant issued by a
detached and neutral magistrate that subsequently is determined to be
invalid."106 Justice Stevens has stated that "the Court has not yet held
that the rule of United States v. Leon ... has any application to warrantless searches."107 As such, the good faith exception currently is applicable only to searches incident to a warrant.
101. Mr. Mertens and Professor Wasserstrom argue that had the good faith exception
existed "the fourth amendment issues resolved in such cases as Chimel v. California,
395 U.S. 752 (1969); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Berger v. New
York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979); and Payton v.
New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980); might never have been decided." Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 83, at 371.
102. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3422.
103. Id. at 3423.
104. See United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Peltier,
422 U.S. 531 (1975).
105. 104 S. Ct. 3424, 3426 (1984).
106. Id. at 3428 (emphasis added).
107. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 104 S. Ct. 3479, 3496 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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The standard is one of objective reasonableness

In determining whether the good faith exception has been met, the
subjective good faith of the officer is not controlling. As the Court stated
in Leon, "the officer's reliance on the magistrate's probable cause determination and on the technical sufficiency of the warrant he issues must
be objectively reasonable."108
The Leon test is analogous to the second prong of the expectation of
privacy test set forth by the Court in Katz v. United States. 109 The Katz
Court stated that to determine whether a search or seizure involved an
area protected by the fourth amendment, a court must apply the twopart expectation of privacy test: first, that a person exhibit an actual,
subjective, expectation of privacy; and second, that the expectation be
one society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable." Since the Katz decision, the Court has been forced to interpret what society, through the
voice of the Court, is prepared to recognize as reasonable. I 10 It is likely
that the Court will face a series of Leon progeny cases interpreting what
society, through the nine-member Supreme Court, is prepared to recognize as "reasonable" police reliance on a search warrant.
3.

What is Unreasonableness?

The Leon Court presented three specific situations where no objectively reasonable grounds exist for believing a warrant is proper: (1)
where the judge or magistrate is mislead by information in an affidavit
that the affiant knew or should have known, absent a reckless disregard
of the truth, was false; (2) where a magistrate abandons his neutral and
detached role; and (3) where a warrant is so lacking in the indicia of
probable cause or so facially invalid that no officer reasonably could rely
upon it.111

a.

Misrepresentations to the issuing Magistrate: when is it enough to
suppress the evidence?

Under Leon, if the judge or magistrate is mislead by an affidavit
containing information that the affiant knew or would have known, absent a reckless disregard for the truth, was false, suppression of the evidence is still an appropriate remedy. To defeat a good faith claim by the
police, the defendant must challenge the truthfulness of the factual statements made in the affidavit supporting the warrant. I 12 In Franks v. Delaware,1I3 the Supreme Court determined when a criminal defendant has
108.
109.
110.
111.

Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3421.
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
[d. at 360-61; see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 739-41 (1979).
Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3421-22. There are actually four examples, but the author is
treating the last two - bare bones affidavit and facially deficient warrant - as one.
112. [d. at 3421.
113.438 U.S. 154 (1978).
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the right to make that challenge. I 14
The Franks Court held that a movant applying for suppression of
evidence must meet two tests before a hearing on the issue of suppression
is required. The defendant must make a substantial preliminary showing
that: I 15 (1) the magistrate was mislead by a false statement that was
knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, included by the affiant in the affidavit; and (2) absent the false statement,
the affidavit does not contain sufficient facts to support a probable cause
determination. 116 At the hearing, if the defendant establishes proof of
the allegations by a preponderance of the evidence, and if the remaining
facts are insufficient to support a probable cause determination, the warrant is voided and the fruits thereof excluded. 117
The police action condemned in Franks - an officer's deliberate
perjury or reckless disregard for the truth - is a blatant example of bad
faith and is precisely the conduct sought to be deterred by the exclusionary rule. 118 Unfortunately, the Franks rule does not ensure adequately
that this bad faith will result in the exclusion of evidence at trial. Under
the second prong of the Franks test, it is assumed that if the issuing magistrate had known that the officer was lying about one fact, the magistrate still would assign the same weight to the other facts in the affidavit,
and the magistrate would believe the other facts, and determine that
probable cause existed. A more likely conclusion is that if the issuing
magistrate had known of the misrepresentation in the affidavit, he would
have been less likely to believe other facts in the affidavit and he would
have denied the warrant application.I 19
114. [d. at 155. The Supreme Court of Delaware held, as a matter of first impression,

115.
116.
117.

118.

119.

that under no circumstances may a defendant challenge the veracity of a sworn
statement. 373 A.2d 578, 579-80 (Del. 1977).
The requirement of a substantial preliminary showing is to prevent the misuse of a
veracity hearing for the purposes of discovery or obstruction. 438 U.S. at 167.
[d. at 155-56.
[d. at 156.
The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily assumes that the police
have engaged in willful, or at the very least negligent, conduct that has deprived the
defendant of some right. By refusing to admit evidence gained as a result of such
conduct, the courts hope to instill in those officers, or in their counterparts, a greater
degree of care toward the rights of the accused. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3419 (quoting
United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 539 (1975».
This is the corollary of the logic behind the self-verifying detail aspect of the probable cause test of Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). If an informant is correct
about some facts, he is probably correct about others. [d. at 244 (quoting Spinelli,
393 U.S. at 427 (White, J., concurring».
The Franks requirement that the affidavit be lacking probable cause without
the illegally obtained facts has been extended to other types of illegal activity. In
United States v. Karo, 104 S. Ct. 3296 (1984), several facts in the affidavit had been
obtained by the unconstitutional use of a beeper. The Karo Court cited Franks for
the proposition that a warrant is not voided so long as there remains sufficient untainted facts in the affidavit to support probable cause. That test is more sensible in
Karo than in Franks. In Karo, the illegally obtained facts did not taint the affidavit
itself because there were sufficient independently obtained facts to support probable
cause. In Franks, the misrepresentations by the affiant officer rendered the whole
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When does the magistrate abandon his role as a neutral decision
maker?

Leon provides that where a magistrate abandons his neutral and detached function, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule does
not apply. Unfortunately, there is no clear test to determine when a
magistrate has abandoned his neutral and detached role.
In Leon, the Supreme Court cited Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York and
held that a police officer cannot reasonably rely on a warrant resulting
from action by a magistrate who has acted inconsistently with his role as
an impartial judge. 120 In Lo-Ji Sales, the investigating officers requested
a warrant to seize films and books from an "adult bookstore." The officer
had viewed two reels of film purchased from the store, taken them to the
town justice, and requested a warqmt to seize copies of the two films and
other "similar" films in the store. The warrant application also included
a request that the town justice accompany the investigator to determine
which of the other films were obscene. 121 Accordingly, the magistrate
included in the warrant the phrase: "The following items that the court
independently [on examination] has determined to be possessed in violation of [the New York State obscenity law.],,122 The magistrate, along
with three state police officers, the investigator, three local police officers,
and three members of the local prosecutor's office, entered the store to
determine which films and books should be seized. The magistrate
viewed twenty-three films and other materials and concluded that there
was probable cause to believe that the material was obscene. 123
According to the Supreme Court, the magistrate in Lo-Ji Sales "allowed himself to become a member, if not the leader, of the search
party."124 Because the town justice undertook to "telescope the process
of the application for a warrant, the issuance of the warrant and its execution,"125 the Court found that the town justice had abandoned his
"neutral and detached role" and thus held that the evidence should be
excluded. 126
The Leon Court decided that no reasonable police officer could believe that a magistrate's action such as the type in Lo-Ji Sales constituted
an independent determination of probable cause and, therefore, no police
officer could be said to rely on such a warrant in good faith.127 The
Court, however, has not provided a test to determine when, short of ac-

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

127.

affidavit suspect because the remaining information also came from the untruthful
affiant.
Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3422 (citing Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319 (1979».
La-Ji Sales, 442 U.S. at 321.
[d. at 321-22.
[d. at 322-23.
[d. at 327.
[d. at 328.
[d. at 329.
104 S. Ct. at 3422.
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tual involvement in the physical investigation, a magistrate abandons his
neutral role.
The Ninth Circuit was faced recently with this issue in United States
v. Hendricks.128 On May 10, 1983, a customs agent in Los Angeles inspected a cardboard box arriving from Brazil and addressed to Hendricks. The address on the box was Hendricks's home address, and was
there for identification purposes only; the box was shipped in a manner
that required him to pick it up personally.!29 Inside the box was a suitcase in which the inspector found five to seven pounds of cocaine. The
customs agent sent the box on to Tucson, Arizona where it was turned
over to Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) officials. 130 While the DEA
agents were holding the box, they gathered other information that was
included in an affidavit for a search warrant for Hendricks's residence.
That information tended to show that Hendricks operated a company
called Brazilian Imports, and that a small amount of cocaine previously
had been sent to the company by mail. \31 There were no facts even remotely suggesting any evidence of a crime at Hendricks's residence.!32
Based on this information and knowing that the box was at the airport in the possession of the DEA agents, the magistrate issued a warrant
for a search of Hendricks's residence. The warrant stated: "on the
premises known as 2835 North Sidney ... there is now being concealed
... a ... cardboard box containing cocaine."!33 The warrant further
stated that "this search warrant is to be executed only upon the condition
that the above described box is brought to the aforesaid premises."!34
The warrant was executed and cocaine was found. Hendricks entered a
conditional guilty plea, appealing only the denial of his suppression
motion.!35
The Hendricks court stated that the effort by the magistrate to limit
his official conduct, not expand it, kept the magistrate within his judicial
role.!36 Consequently, the good faith exception was applicable, and the
cocaine seized at Hendricks's residence was not required to be excluded
at trial. Lo-Ji Sales thus properly is limited to its facts by Hendricks.
c.

Appellate review of a "bare bones" affidavit

The Leon Court stated that where a warrant is lacking facially in the
indicia of probable cause and reliance on it is unreasonable, there is an
128. 743 F.2d 653 (9th Cir. 1984).
129. Id. at 653.
130.Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 656.
133. Id. at 654 (emphasis supplied by the court).
134. Id. (emphasis supplied by the court).
135. Id. The court stressed the good faith of the officers in executing the search, but did
not list expressly what was seized, or even if the box itself was seized. We must infer
that cocaine was seized from Hendricks's conditional plea of guilty.
136. Id. at 656.
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absence of good faith. Thus, if an affidavit contains so few facts that it is
a "mere ratification of the bare conclusions of others," 137 a police officer
cannot have manifested objective good faith in either applying for or executing the warrant.138 The current test for appellate review of a magistrate's probable cause determination, as set forth by the Supreme Court
in Illinois v. Gates,139 has so relaxed the standard of appellate review of
warrants that a discussion of that test is necessary to understand the
scope of the Leon "bare bones" test.
In Gates, the Supreme Court revised the standard for determining
when a warrant is supported by probable cause. The Court stated that
an issuing magistrate must apply a two-part test: first, the magistrate
must decide whether the affidavit contains sufficient facts on which to
make a probable cause decision; and second, the magistrate must review
the "totality of the circumstances" to determine if probable cause exists. l40 The Court found that the job of a reviewing court, however, is
limited to "ensur[ing] that the magistrate had a 'substantial basis for conclud[ing]' that probable cause existed."141 If the appellate court decides
that there are sufficient facts to support a probable cause determination,
the appellate court's job is over; the reviewing court should not substitute
its interpretation of the evidence for that of the magistrate. 142
The Gates Court noted that the earlier Supreme Court cases of Nathanson v. United States 143 and Aguilar v. Texas 144 "illustrate the limits
beyond which a magistrate may not venture in issuing a warrant."145
The affidavits at issue in Nathanson and Aguilar failed to provide the
137. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3417 (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983».
138. See Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3421 n. 24. The rationale here is based on the assumption
that police are trained to know that an affidavit must contain sufficient facts to
support a probable cause determination. /d. at 3421. If a magistrate issues a warrant upon an affidavit that is so facially deficient of facts that any police officer
would know that the affidavit could not possibly support an independent probable
cause determination, then no police officer may rely reasonably upon that warrant
and execute it in good faith. Id. at 3422.
139. 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
140. The Court's statement of the magistrate's task is as follows: "The task of the magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the
circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him ... there is a fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." 462 U.S. at
238. The author's interpretation of the task as two faceted comes from an analysis
of the two Gates requirements: (1) great deference should be given to the magistrate's decision, 462 U.S. at 213; and (2) the totality of the circumstances test. 462
U.S. at 230, 238.
141. 462 U.S. at 238 (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960».
142. The Court stated: "Similarly, we have repeatedly said that after-the-fact scrutiny of
the sufficiency of an affidavit should not take the form of a de novo review. A magistrate's 'determination of probable cause should be paid great deference by reviewing
courts.''' /d. at 236 (quoting Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 (1969».
143. 260 U.S. 41 (1933).
144. 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
145. Gates, 462 U.S. at 239.
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magistrate with a substantial basis for determining probable cause. The
Nathanson warrant contained the following language:
Whereas said Francis B. Laughin has stated under his oath that
he has cause to suspect and does believe that . . . liquors of
foreign origin ... upon which the duties have not been paid, or
which has otherwise been brought into the United States contrary to law, ... is [sic] now deposited and contained within the
premises .... 146
The Aguilar affidavit contained "[a]n officer's statement that [a]ffiants
have reviewed reliable information from a credible person and do believe
that heroin is stored in a home .... "147 The Gates Court noted that
when the evidence goes beyond Nathanson and Aguilar, no prescribed set
of rules is feasible. 148 This statement, together with the requirement that
a magistrate's determination be given great deference,149 implies that an
appellate reversal under Gates will only occur where there is a "bare
bones" affidavit.
The Gates decision relates directly to the "bare bones" example discussed in Leon. In Leon, the Court stated that a facially invalid warrant
exists where no reasonable assertion of objective good faith can be made.
If the Gates probable cause test and standard of review effectively has
narrowed the probable cause standard of review to a finding of "no facts
upon which a magistrate can base a decision," then it is essentially the
same test that Justice White, in Leon, suggests for finding a lack of good
faith. As such, the standard of review under Leon should be the same as
the standard set forth in Gates.
Justice White stated in Leon that "[e]ven if the warrant application
is supported by more than a 'bare bones' affidavit a reviewing court properly may conclude that, notwithstanding the deference that magistrates
deserve, the warrant was invalid because the magistrate's probable cause
determination reflected an improper analysis of the totality of the circumstances, or because the form of the warrant was improper in some
respect."150 That a reviewing court may find no probable cause despite
more than "barebones," is at best a rationalization of, and at worst a
misinterpretation of, the standard set forth in Gates. In contrast, a warrant invalidated for a technical problem with the form of the warrant, is
exactly when the good faith exception should be applied. 151
The ability of an appellate court to overturn a trial court's factually
supportable probable cause determination is questionable particularly in
light of the more recent Supreme Court case of Massachusetts v.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Nathanson, 290 U.S. at 44.
Gates, 462 U.S. at 213 (quoting Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 108).
Jd. at 239.
Jd. at 236; see infra notes 152-57 and accompanying text.
150. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3417.
151. See infra notes 167-77 and accompanying text.
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Upton.1S2 In Upton, the Court interpreted and applied the Gates standard of review in a search and seizure case. The Upton Court found that
the Massachusetts court erred in failing to give deference to the magistrate's decision because the Massachusetts court did not limit its decision
to "whether the evidence viewed as a whole provided a 'substantial basis'
for the magistrate's finding of probable cause."153 Instead, the Massachusetts court engaged in a de novo probable cause determination. 154
The Supreme Court stated that the job of interpreting and weighing each
fact and drawing inferences from those facts is the magistrate's alone,
and it is enough that the inferences drawn be reasonable and conform
with the other pieces of evidence making up the total showing of probable cause. 155 The Court added that "[i]n concluding that there was
probable cause for the issuance of this warrant, the magistrate can hardly
be accused of approving a mere 'hunch' or bare recital of legal conclusions."156 This suggests that in order for a probable cause determination
to be reversed properly under Gates/Upton, the magistrate's probable
cause determination must be based on hunches or bare recitals of legal
conclusions. 157 Thus, a valid finding of no probable cause should not
coincide with a finding of objective good faith.
The Ninth Circuit's Hendricks 158 decision applies the correct standard of appellate review for probable cause, but reaches the wrong conclusion regarding the good faith exception. The Hendricks court
properly recognized that its probable cause review was limited to determining whether the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding
that the box was at Hendricks's house at the time the warrant was issued. 159 Under the Gates/Upton test, although the facts in the affidavit
could support a determination that Hendricks was involved in crime,
there was not a single fact that could support a probable cause determination that the box was at his house or on its way to his house. l60 In
fact, the magistrate knew the box was not at the house, but rather in the
152. 104 S. Ct. 2085 (1984) (per curiam).
153. The Supreme Court pointed out that the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,
in Commonwealth v. Upton, 390 Mass. 562,458 N.E.2d 717 (1983), had misinterpreted the Gates holding in both respects: (1) the state court did not believe that
Gates abandoned the Aguilar/Spinelli test; and (2) the state court did not give deference to the magistrate's decision. [d. at 2088.
154. [d.
155. [d. at 2088-89.
156. [d. (emphasis added).
157. See Gates, 462 U.S. 213 at 239.
158. 743 F.2d 653 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1362 (1985); see supra notes
128-36 and accompanying text.
159. 743 F.2d at 654-56.
160. /d. at 654. The court distinguished this case from "controlled delivery" cases,
where the government knows that the object is on a sure course to the house, for
example by mail. See United States v. Goff, 681 F.2d 1238 (9th Cir. 1982); United
States v. Lowe, 575 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 869 (I978); United
States ex rei. Beal v. Skaff, 418 F.2d 430 (7th Cir. 1969).
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hands of the DEA agents. 161 Consequently, the Ninth Circuit found that
probable cause did not exist because there was no basis for a probable
cause determination. 162 The Ninth Circuit also stated that although the
warrant was invalid, the evidence was not excludable because of the good
faith exception.
The appellant in Hendricks argued that the magistrate had abandoned his judicial role, but did not argue that either of the other two
Leon limitations on the good faith exception applied. 163 Therefore, the
court decided only that the magistrate had not abandoned his neutral
and detached role and that there was good faith reliance by the officer on
the warrant.
Although the point was not argued by the parties, the court should
have concluded that the Hendricks case was a prime example of "a warrant based on an affidavit 'so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to
render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.' "164 The
court suggested that the sentence in the warrant, "this search warrant is
to be executed only upon the condition that the above described box is
brought to the aforesaid premises," established good faith on the part of
the officers. 165 If anything, however, there was not only objective bad
faith but also SUbjective bad faith; the officers knew at the time they applied for the warrant that the box was not at, or on its way to, Hendricks's house.
The Hendricks decision seems to be an example of the kind of misapplication of the good faith exception that Justice Blackmun, in his concurring opinion in Leon, feared would occur. Although Justice
Blackmun agreed that the good faith exception was unavoidable because
the exclusionary rule was not mandated constitutionally, he expressed a
concern that police compliance with the fourth amendment might be
"materially changed" as a result. 166 In Hendricks, it appears that his
fears have become a reality. Conversely, the second part of Justice
White's statement in Leon, that a warrant may be invalidated because of
a technical problem with the form of the warrant, 167 is the exact situation
161. 743 F.2d at 654.
162. Id. at 655-56.
163. Id. at 656.
164. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3422 (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610-11 (Powell, J.,
concurring in part».
165. Hendricks, 743 F.2d at 654, 656.
166. Justice Blackmun stated:
By their very nature, the assumptions on which we proceed today cannot
be cast in stone. To the contrary, they now will be tested in the real world
of state and federal law enforcement, this Court will attend to the results.
If it should emerge from experience that, contrary to our expectations, the
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule results in a material change
in police compliance with the Fourth Amendment, we shall have to reconsider what we have undertaken here.
Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3424 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
167. See supra text accompanying note 151.
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where the good faith exception should apply.
This was precisely the situation involved in Massachusetts v. Sheppard. '68 There, a police officer had gathered evidence in the investigation
of a homicide and had drafted an affidavit to support an application for
an arrest warrant and a search warrant. 169 The affidavit stated that the
police wished to search for certain described items, including clothing of
the victim and a possible weaponYo Because it was Sunday, the officer
had a difficult time finding a warrant application form. The detective
used a form previously used in drug cases. 171 After making some
changes, the officer submitted the form to the judge, telling the judge that
it might need to be changed. The judge then concluded that the affidavit
established probable cause and assured the officer that he would make
whatever changes to the form of the affidavit required to make it
proper. 172 The judge made some changes, but not enough to withstand a
strict technical attack. 173 The ensuing search was limited to those items
listed in the affidavit and some evidence was recovered. 174 At the pretrial
suppression hearing the trial judge ruled the evidence admissible, because
of the officer's good faith. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
reversed. 175 The Supreme Court, however, upheld the trial judge's ruling of admissibility. 176
Sheppard is the precise example of objective good faith on the part
of the police. The officer had gathered all the information necessary to
establish probable cause. He was investigating a brutal murder; was of
the essence. The affidavit contained a description of what was to be
seized, but because the judge failed to incorporate the affidavit by reference on the form, the warrant was technically invalid. 177
Sheppard is distinguishable from the facts of Hendricks in that the
police officer in Sheppard had sufficient evidence to establish probable
cause and satisfy the "particularity of items to be seized" requirement for
the issuance of a warrant. In Sheppard, suppression of the evidence
could not possibly serve any deterrent purpose. The officer had satisfied
all of the requirements of the fourth amendment and been assured that
the form was correct. The officer even expressed his concern that the
form of the warrant be corrected if necessary. In Hendricks, the deterrent effect served would be to prevent police officers from applying for
warrants unless there was evidence that the contraband was on the premises to be searched.
168.
169.
170.
171.

104 U.S. 3424 (1984).
Id. at 3427.
Id.
Id.
172. !d.
173.Id.
174. !d. at 3428.
175. !d.; Commonwealth v. Sheppard, 387 Mass. 488, 441 N.E.2d 725 (1982).
176. Sheppard, 104 U.S. at 3430.
177. Id. at 3429 n.7.
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In sum, when a warrant is so lacking in the indicia of probable cause
that it fails the Gates test, it also should fail the Leon good faith test.
Where, however, an officer has acquired all relevant evidence to support
the probable cause and particularity requirements of the fourth amendment but the warrant is technically invalid in form, the good faith exception should be applied.
IV.

A GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION TO WARRANTLESS
SEARCHES

The fourth amendment provides that no searches may be conducted
without a warrant. On many occasions, however, the Court has created
exceptions to the warrant requirement. 178 Although the Leon Court created a good faith exception only for searches pursuant to a warrant, the
Court did not preclude the possibility of extending the exception to warrantless searches.

A.

The Fifth Circuit's Adoption of a Good Faith Exception to
Warrantless Searches

In United States v. Williams, 179 the Fifth Circuit explicitly adopted a
good faith exception to warrantless searches and seizures. 180 In Williams, the appellant was arrested in Atlanta for violation of an order
prohibiting travel from Ohio. In a search incident to her arrest, a packet
of heroin was found in her coat. Based upon that information, the DEA
officer requested and received a warrant to search her bags. This search
revealed a larger quantity of heroin. 181 Williams claimed that all the evidence was excludable because her arrest was illegal and the resulting
search and information upon which the search warrant was based were,
therefore, tainted. 182 The court found that the arrest was lega}183 and
178. The Supreme Court has recognized six exceptions to the warrant requirement: (I)
searches incident to a lawful arrest; New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981);
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1983); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752
(1969); (2) "automobile" searches; United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); (3) "hot pursuit" and other exigent circumstances; Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967); cf Mincey v. Arizona, 437
U.S. 385 (1978); (4) consent searches; Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218
(1973); (5) "stop and frisk" searches; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I (1968); Bumper v.
North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968); and (6) "plain view" searches; Texas v.
Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). For
a complete discussion of exceptions to the warrant requirement, see 2 W. LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE 5.1-8.6 (1978 & Supp. 1985); 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE 9.1-9.6 (1978 & Supp. 1985).
179.622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981).
180. Id. at 840-48. This was the holding of Part II of the Williams opinion. In Part I of
the opinion, the court found that the arrest had in fact been legal. Id. at 839. This
raises a question as to whether Part II is an alternative ground for the decision or
dictum. See Williams, 622 F.2d at 848-49 (Rubin, J., concurring).
181. 622 F.2d at 834.
182. Id. at 835.
183. Id. at 833-39.
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that the good faith exception should be adopted for warrantless searches
and seizures. ls4 The Williams court set out two facets to the good faith
exception: "technical violation" and "good faith mistake."lss The technical violation applies when an officer relies upon: (1) a statute that is
declared unconstitutional; (2) a warrant that is later declared invalid; or
(3) a court precedent that is later overruled. ls6 The good faith mistake
applies when an officer makes a judgmental error concerning the existence of probable cause. IS7 The technical violation facet of the good faith
184. Id. at 840-47.
185. Id. at 841.
186. Id. This is the same rationale behind the Supreme Court holdings in Michigan v.
DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979) (good faith reliance on presumptively constitutional
statute), United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984) (good faith reliance on search
warrant), and United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975) (good faith reliance on
prior court decisions).
187. Williams, 622 F.2d at 840. The only fourth amendment Supreme Court cases cited
by the Williams court in support of its "good faith mistake" rule were United States
v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976), and Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
Neither the holdings nor rationales of either of these cases support the rule. Both
Janis and Tucker were decided on grounds other than the good or bad faith of the
police officers; in both cases good faith was not determinate of the propriety of suppression.
In Janis, the Supreme Court held the exclusionary rule inapplicable to civil
proceedings. The rationale behind that ruling is that law enforcement officers are
concerned primarily with enforcing the criminal, not civil, law and thus the exclusion in a civil case of evidence seized by police will have no deterrent effect. The
Williams court seized upon the mention of "good faith" by the Janis court to suggest that the good faith of the officers was the basis for the Janis opinion. What the
Williams court ignored, however, is that under Janis the exclusionary rule is inapplicable to civil proceedings irrespective of the good or bad faith of the officers. The
Janis Court concluded that exclusion from federal civil proceedings of evidence unlawfully seized by a state criminal enforcement officer has not been shown to have a
sufficient likelihood of deterring the conduct of the state police officer to outweigh
the societal costs imposed by exclusion. Janis, 428 U.S. at 454.
In Tucker, the Supreme Court held it improper to suppress the testimony of a
witness whose identity was discovered by a violation of the defendant's rights under
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The Court reasoned that the deterrent
effect of the exclusionary rule was fulfilled by suppressing the accused's own words.
Tucker, 417 U.S. at 448. The Tucker case was very narrow in the respect that the
case involved a change of law subsequent to the police conduct~ What the officer did
was legal under the old law, but illegal under the change. It is interesting that the
Williams court cited the rather narrow Tucker case but ignored the more broad
holding of United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1977), where the Supreme
Court held that whenever a witness's identity is discovered by a constitutional violation, that witness's testimony will not be excluded absent a direct link between the
illegality and the resulting testimony, 435 U.S. at 278-80. The Court noted that, in
determining whether the testimony of a live witness found by unconstitutional
methods should be suppressed, factors to be considered are the length of the "road"
between the violation and the witness's testimony (attenuation) and the degree of
free will exercised by the witness. !d. at 276-79. Good faith is not listed as a factor.
Moreover, in quoting the Janis and Tucker dictum out of context, the Williams
court ignored the "neutral and detached" magistrate requirement of the fourth
amendment. Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 497 U.S. 345 (1972); Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948); see
infra note 193 and accompanying text.
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exception is supported by both the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary
rule and Supreme Court precedent; the good faith mistake facet is supported by neither.
In support of the "technical violation" facet of the good faith exception, the court relied in part upon Michigan v. DeFillippo,188 which held
that evidence seized pursuant to a statute later declared unconstitutional
should not be suppressed. 189 The logic behind that holding, and the technical violation aspect of the good faith exception as well, is that a police
officer has done all that is required of him - he has followed the law as it
existed at the time of his actions.190 There is no possible deterrent effect
in suppressing evidence seized pursuant to a presumptively valid statute. 191 This is the same reasoning relied upon by the Supreme Court in
United States v. Leon. 192
In situations like Defillippo and Leon, the police officer has no
choice but to follow the path laid for him by another governmental body
or officer. Those situations are very different from the situation in which
the officer must make the choice of which path to follow. What the Williams court failed to consider in adopting the "good faith mistake" facet
of the good faith exception is that the fourth amendment not only guards
against searches without probable cause, but also against searches where
the probable cause determination is made by someone other than a neutral and detached magistrate. 193 As Justice Jackson stated in Johnson v.
United States: 194
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not
grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men
draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that
those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate
instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. 195
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

443 U.S. 31 (1979).
[d.
[d. at 36-38.
Williams, 622 F.2d at 842; DeFillippo, 443 U.S. at 38.
104 S.
3405 (1984). The Fifth Circuit has relied upon the broad language in
United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975), which stated "evidence obtained from a
search should be suppressed only if it can be said that the law enforcement officer
had knowledge, or may properly be charged with knowledge, that the search was
unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment." Williams, 622 F.2d at 843. That
statement taken out of context would seem to support all actions where the police
have a good faith belief that their conduct is not violative of the fourth amendment.
The Peltier case, however, dealt with the situation where a law enforcement officer
relied upon an administrative process that consistently had been approved. The
Peltier decision was actually a refusal of the Court to apply retroactively the decision that overruled the rule relied upon by the officer.
193. Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 497 U.S. 345 (1972); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443 (1971); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
194. 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
195. [d. at 13-14.
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The Constitutionality of a Good Faith Exception to Warrantless
Searches and Seizures

A good faith exception to warrantless searches and seizures could be
recognized in two situations: (1) where the officer reasonably believes
that there is probable cause and fails to obtain a warrant; and (2) where
the officer reasonably believes that the search falls into one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement.
To allow an officer in the field to make a probable cause decision
without obtaining a warrant, absent one of the recognized exceptions to
the warrant requirement, would contradict directly the "neutral and detached magistrate" requirement of Johnson. 196 Because the purpose of
the exclusionary rule is to deter unconstitutional police conduct, 197 it follows that an officer's independent probable cause determination is precisely the conduct to be deterred. The exclusionary rule deters not only
wrong decisions in the execution of a warrant, but also the mere making
of a decision where the officer should apply for a warrant. 198 Because
exclusion of evidence in such a case furthers the deterrent purpose of the
exclusionary rule, an extension of the good faith exception to such situations would be improper.
The extension of the good faith exception to an officer's reasonable
belief that one of the warrantless exceptions exists would hinder the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule and be unnecessary. If the extension is made, the officer who is not sure whether the circumstances
support a warrantless exception, would, in essence, be rewarded for conducting a search in good faith. Suppression of evidence, however, would
deter illegal police action by discouraging police from making judgments
regarding warrantless exceptions.
On several occasions the Supreme Court has opted for a "brightline" rule approach to warrantless searches instead of proceeding on a
factual case-by-case determination. When one of the prescribed situations allowing a warrantless search exists, the search should be upheld
without addressing whether each of the original reasons behind the particular warrantless exception exists. 199 This creates a system of "brightline" rules that police may follow, instead of making in-the-field judgments as to the exigencies of each situation. In support of this rule-oriented approach, the Court has upheld searches incident to lawful arrests
where the danger to the policeman was minima1. 2°O Additionally, the
Court has upheld automobile searches even where the owner has been
196. Id.
197. E.g., United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465
(1974); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
198. Johnson, 333 U.S. at 13-14.
199. See C. WHITEBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 6.01 at 33 (1980).
200. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 281 (1973) (defendant stopped for traffic
violation).
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separated from his automobile. 201 These holdings not only make the job
of the policeman easier, they also follow the premise that, absent some
predetermined authority, the decision to stop and search should be made
by a neutral and detached magistrate.
Additionally, it is unnecessary to extend the good faith exception to
warrantless searches because each of the present exceptions to the warrant requirement already contain a reasonableness requirement. For instance, the search incident to arrest is limited by the reasonableness of the
scope and intensity of the search.202 Similarly, the hot pursuit or exigency exception requires that the search not continue beyond a reasonable period of time. 203 Because of the inherent objective reasonableness
justifying each of the warrantless exceptions, and the deterrent effect of
suppressing evidence obtained where an officer has acted upon probable
cause but without a warrant, the good faith exception should not be extended to warrantless searches.
V.

MARYLAND'S TREATMENT OF THE GOOD FAITH
EXCEPTION

There has been an emerging trend among state appellate courts to
afford citizens greater protection under their state constitutions than the
Supreme Court has afforded under the federal constitution. 204 The
Supreme Court of Oregon, has been a leader in this trend. In State v.
Davis,205 the Supreme Court of Oregon, relying on prior Oregon precedent, rejected the United States Supreme Court's deterrent analysis regarding the exclusionary rule. 206 To counteract this trend among the
state courts, the United States Supreme Court in Michigan v. Long 207
201. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); see United States v. Roth, 4S6 U.S. 798
(1983).
202. See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. S6 (1950); Harris v. United States, 331
U.S. 145 (1947); Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
203. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
Also, the automobile exception, although allowing searches after the exigency
apparently has dissipated, Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), still requires
that there be some exigency at the point of confrontation. See Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 393 U.S. at 42, 52. The stop and frisk exception requires articulable
suspicion, an objective test that will not be satisfied by mere "hunches." Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. I (1968); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968). The plain view
doctrine requires not only a reasonable initial intrusion, but also a reasonable inadvertence in discovering the evidence. Coolidge, 339 U.S. at 469-71. But see Texas v.
Brown, 103 S. Ct. 1535 (1983). Consent searches require that the consent be obtained reasonably and voluntarily. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218
(1973).
204. In Sterling v. Cupp, 290 Or. 611, 625 P.2d 123 (1981), the Oregon court granted
prison inmates a higher level of privacy under the state constitution than would
have been applicable under the federal constitution. Id. at 126-33. The court reasoned that, "the proper sequence is to analyze the state's law, including its constitutional law before reaching a federal constitutional claim." Id. at 126.
205. 295 Or. 227, 666 P.2d 802 (1983).
206. Id. at 235, 666 P.2d at 807.
207. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
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held that a state court decision is based presumptively on federal grounds
and; therefore, reviewable unless it is shown explicitly in the state court
opinion that the decision is based only on the state constitution or supporting state precedent. 20s
Maryland courts have consistently followed the Supreme Court's interpretations of the fourth amendment. In Potts v. State,209 the Court of
Appeals of Maryland followed the Supreme Court's analysis in Illinois v.
Gates 2\0 and refused to offer the defendant more protection under article
26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. 2I I The Potts court stated that
article 26 and the fourth amendment developed from the same historical
background and that article 26 is in pari materia with its federal counterpart. Based on this reasoning, the court adopted the totality of circumstances standard of review as set forth in Gates. 212
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland already has adopted the
good faith exception. In Randall Book Corp. v. State,213 that court interpreted Leon as requiring that a warrant be suppressed "only if the officers
were dishonest or reckless or could not have harbored an objectively reasonable belief in the existence of probable cause."214 The court also
noted that there was no assertion that the judge who issued the warrant
had abandoned his proper role. 215 Thus, the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland listed the same three examples of bad faith stated in Leon: the
officer recklessly misleading the magistrate,216 the magistrate abandoning
his neutral and detached role,217 and the "bare bones" affidavit.2ls
In Randall Book Corp., the court addressed the problem in the
proper procedural manner. The court decided that there had been a
fourth amendment violation;219 the court then concluded that the good
faith exception prohibited exclusion of the evidence. 220 This is the correct procedure because it allows appellate courts to provide guidance to
the magistrates regarding the adequacy of issued warrants. If the case
were decided on good faith alone, judges would be unable to ascertain
any new constitutional violations. 221
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

Id. at 3474-78.
300 Md. 567,479 A.2d 1335 (1984).
462 U.S. 213 (1983).
Potts, 300 Md. at 576-77, 479 A.2d at 1340.
Id.
64 Md. App. 589, 497 A.2d 1174 (1985), cert. denied, 305 Md. 175, 452 A.2d 187
(1986).
Id. at 602, 497 A.2d at 1180.
Id.
See supra notes 112-19 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 120-36 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 137-77 and accompanying text.
64 Md. App. at 600-01, 497 A.2d at 1179.
Id. at 602, 497 A.2d at 1180.
See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION

In United States v. Leon,222 the Supreme Court adopted the good
faith exception to the exclusionary rule. The test set forth to determine
good faith is an objective one.
Adopting a good faith exception for technically invalid warrants is
consistent with the concept of deterring police misconduct. Extension of
a good faith exception to warrantless searches that violate the fourth
amendment, however, would be inconsistent with the deterrence rationale of the exclusionary rule. That extension would encourage police officers to make probable cause determinations themselves, one of the evils
prohibited by the Supreme Court's interpretation of the fourth amendment. The good faith exception does not, and should not, apply to warrantless searches. Rather, it should be restricted to technical violations in
the form of the search warrant such as the violation in Massachusetts v.
Sheppard. 223
The future of the good faith exception appears to be in the hands of
the police officers themselves. As Justice Blackman expressed it in his
concurrence in Leon:
If it should emerge from experience that, contrary to our
expectations, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule
results in a material change in police compliance with the
Fourth Amendment, we shall have to reconsider what we have
undertaken here . . . .
If a single principle may be drawn from this Court's exclusionary rule decisions ... it is that the scope of the exclusionary
rule is subject to change in light of changing judicial understanding about the effects of the rule outside the confines of the
courtroom. It is incumbent on the Nation's law enforcement
officers, who must continue to observe the Fourth Amendment
in the wake of today's decisions, to recognize the double-edged
nature of that principle. 224

Thomas Page Lloyd

222. 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984).
223. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 104 S. Ct. 3427 (1984); see supra notes 167-77 and accompanying text.
224. United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3424 (1984) (Blackman, J., concurring).

